Cải cách tiền lương là một trong những nội dung quan trọng sẽ được thảo luận tại Kỳ họp thứ 6, Quốc hội khóa XV và đây cũng là một trong những chìa khoá để mở ra các chính sách đãi ngộ nhằm góp phần xây dựng, phát triển đội ngũ trí thức nước nhà, đáp ứng yêu cầu phát triển đất nước nhanh và bền vững trong giai đoạn mới như nội dung mà Hội nghị Trung ương 8 khoá (...) XIII, Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng đã thảo luận. (shrink)

Hình ảnh: Quả cây dâu ta, non màu trắng, lớn hồng nhạt, rồi đậm dần. Tới lúc đỏ tươi là sắp chín. Khi chín, quả tím sẫm, thậm chí đen.

This interview, conducted over the span of several months, tracks the respective journeys of Constantin V. Boundas and Daniel W. Smith with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Rather than “becoming Deleuzian,” which is neither desirable nor possible, these exchanges reflect an array of encounters with Deleuze. These include the initial discoveries of Deleuze’s writings by Boundas and Smith, in-person meetings between Boundas and Deleuze, and the wide-ranging and influential philosophical work on Deleuze’s concepts produced by both Boundas and Smith. At (...) stake in this discussion are key contributions by Deleuze to continental philosophy, including the distinction between the virtual and the actual and the very nature of a “concept.” Also at stake is the formative or pedagogical impact of a philosopher, like Deleuze, on those who find and fully engage with his texts, concepts, and project. Cette interview, menée sur plusieurs mois, suit les parcours respectifs de Constantin V. Boundas et Daniel W. Smith avec la philosophie de Gilles Deleuze. Au lieu de « devenir Deleuzien, » ce qui n’est ni souhaitable ni possible, ces échanges reflètent un éventail de rencontres avec Deleuze. Il s’agit notamment des premières découvertes des écrits de Deleuze par Boundas et Smith, des rencontres en personne entre Boundas et Deleuze, et du travail philosophique vaste et in????luent sur les concepts de Deleuze produit par Boundas et Smith. L’enjeu ici étant les contributions clés de Deleuze à la philosophie continentale, y compris la distinction entre le virtuel et l’actuel, et la nature même d’un « concept. » Mais il y a aussi l’impact formateur ou pédagogique d’un philosophe, comme Deleuze, sur ceux qui trouvent et s’engagent pleinement dans ses textes, ses concepts et ses projets. (shrink)

ETUDIER dans les fonds secrets dans les bibliothèques est une question capitale pour l'ensemble des pays de l'ex-Europe de l'Est.

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Nicole Oresme raises a question that he is apparently the first to ask in these terms, in such a context: do all beings have the desire to persevere into being? Before him, this question is not found in any of the medieval commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. But after him it became canonical until at least the 16th century, since it can be found in Pietro Pomponazzi’s works for example. The novelty here consists in questioning (...) the validity of Averroes’ thesis, in his own commentary on the Physics, according to which all beings have the desire to persist into being, using the Augustinian analysis of voluntary death and suicide. How can we explain that one can freely put an end to his days if he is naturally inclined by a desire for life and even for eternity? Oresme’s solution consists in justifying not only the possibility, but also the moral obligation to accept death under certain conditions. In most cases, we do not really want to die. The desperate man wishes to cancel his misfortune and the heroic man who sacrifices himself for his country wishes to immortalize himself in the memory of other men. From a moral point of view, Nicole Oresme justifies only one case of voluntary death: that of individual sacrifice for the common good. The aim of this paper is to analyze precisely this important turning point in the long history of the notion of conatus in the West by comparing this quaestio from the commentary on the Physics with the glosses that accompany the French translation of the Nicomachean Ethics realised by Oresme at the court of Charles V. (shrink)

L. Gazziero, « “Οἰκείως τῇ λογικῇ πραγματείᾳ” (Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, 12.11). Contraintes disciplinaires – anciennes et modernes – de l’interprétation logique des Catégories d’Aristote », dans V. Brière et J. Lemaire (éd.), Qu’est-ce qu’une catégorie ? Interprétations d’Aristote, Leuven, Peeters, 2019, p. 9-59 [ISBN 9789042936621] -/- In addition to understanding the very notion of « category » according to its different Aristotelian contexts, the first order of business of an archaeology of Aristotle’s categories is to inquire into its (...) influential evolution at the hands of Late Ancient commentators. The essay retraces the origin and development of the « logical » interpretation which held sway both in ancient and modern times. It shows first that the key to understand the debate between Benveniste and Derrida over Aristotle’s categories is to be found in the Neoplatonic exegesis of the work of the same name. It shows next the powerful dynamic that led the commentators to dismiss more than a few hints in the text itself in order to build a remarkably consistent interpretation that understood the notion of category as the simplest and most fundamental element in a building block theory of linguistic expression and argumentation. -/- Face au foisonnement qui caractérise l’instruction contemporaine du dossier des « catégories » d’Aristote, il est encore et toujours utile de suivre le fil historique inauguré par Adolf Trendelenburg, réinventé par Emile Benveniste et élevé par Jacques Derrida au rang d’impératif méthodologique. Le geste inaugural d’une archéologie de la notion de « catégorie » consiste donc à se prémunir contre le risque d’évacuer le problème historique des catégories à la faveur d’une catégorialité anachronique ou passe-partout : ce qui n’est possible qu’à condition de replacer les « catégories » dans les différents contextes aristotéliciens où elles sont utilisées et d’interroger les contraintes disciplinaires qui ont structuré le débat autour de leur nature chez les commentateurs de l’Antiquité tardive. (shrink)

Plus qu’un régime ou un mode de vie, le véganisme est un mouvement social et politique visant à libérer les animaux du joug humain. S’opposant au carnisme, les véganes renoncent autant que possible à utiliser des produits ou des services issus de leur exploitation. Leurs arguments rencontrent aujourd’hui un écho de plus en plus favorable parmi les consommateurs, alors même que les animaux, sur terre et dans la mer, n’ont jamais été tués dans de si grandes proportions. Cet essai est (...) l’occasion pour ses auteurs de montrer que la société que les véganes appellent de leurs vœux (et préfigurent par leurs pratiques quotidiennes) repose sur une conception élargie de la justice. Une justice qui devrait embrasser l’ensemble des êtres doués de sensibilité. (shrink)

Resumen: En este ensayo discuto la crítica de John Campbell a la tesis de la inescrutabilidad de la referencia de Quine. Primero defiendo que los argumentos de Campbell no dan en el blanco, pues él pasa por alto la conexión que Quine traza entre referencia, cuantificación, y ontología. Luego discuto otra línea de argumentación contra la inescrutabilidad que invoca la concepción relacional de la atención de Campbell. Finalmente, sugiero que esta línea –aunque insuficiente y necesitada de complemento– pone de manifiesto (...) que tras las posturas de ambos autores sobre la referencia hay importantes ideales filosóficos hacia los cuales debe dirigirse la discusión. (shrink)

On compte, parmi les nombreux ennemis de Kevin Mulligan, une foule de personnes bigarrées et (selon notre professeur) profondément vicieuses : les philosophes continentaux, les pharisiens, les amis de l’Europe, des Droits de l’Homme, du politiquement correct, des lettres, des études genres et bien sûr, les gauchistes. On peut faire remonter le terme "gauchiste" à Lénine (1920) qui en usait pour designer cette gauche (communiste) qui, pour rester fidèle à son idéologie, refusait de participer aux élections et, par conséquent, était (...) condamnée à rester éternellement un groupuscule. Pour Vladimir Illich, le vice des gauchistes est prudentiel : parce qu’ils sont focalisés sur leur idéologie, les gauchistes n’agissent pas pour prendre le pouvoir. Ce vice est doublé d’une faute épistémique : en s’arc-boutant (comme des enfants) sur leurs principes – quitte à ne jamais voir leurs idées aboutir –, les gauchistes sont bêtes. Le reproche de Lénine n’est pas très éloigné de celui que l’on fait habituellement à la gauche : elle a de grands rêves irréalisables qu’elle ne cherche jamais à concrétiser – ou de manière magistralement infantile. Cette vision du gauchiste comme un brave hippie un peu benêt sous-estime largement, à mon sens, les vices instanciés par les personnes atteintes de cette maladie politique. -/- Dans cet article, je vous propose d’explorer avec moi tous les vices du gauchisme en regardant, pour commencer, (I) ce que sont la gauche et la droite, puis en avançant pas à pas, (II) une définition en conditions nécessaires et suffisantes du gauchisme. Il conviendra également de ne pas oublier son opposé, tout aussi dangereux (et trop méconnu), le droitisme. C’est pourquoi, une fois que nous aurons caractérisé le gauchisme, je proposerai (III) une définition du droitisme en détaillant ses vices les plus inavouables. Nous pourrons alors (IV) identifier ce qu’est, en général, cette maladie infantile de la politique, suite à quoi (V) je vous prescrirai un vaccin pour vous en prémunir. Avant de débuter, il convient de préciser que si nous parlons ici de gauchisme et de droitisme, nous ne faisons aucune assomption concernant la gauche et la droite ; une personne de gauche n’est pas nécessairement un gauchiste ; de même, tout homme ou femme de droite qui se respecte cherche à tout prix à éviter les droitistes (et vice versa). (shrink)

(Back Cover:) « La pensée métaphysique renaîtra demain. Ce sont des savants qui ont le goût et le sens de la pensée conduite jusqu’au terme de ses exigences internes, et des philosophes initiés aux sciences expérimentales qui, en commun, la feront. » L’œuvre de Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) illustre parfaitement cette recherche de la métaphysique d’un monde en devenir, qui sait écouter et se modeler sur la transformation – la métamorphose – promise à une Création finalisée. Le trait commun aux exposés (...) ici présentés sous forme définitive a été cette recherche autour d’une pensée qui renouvelle de l’intérieur la métaphysique en réalisant le vœu de Bergson qu’elle devienne « auscultatrice », que l’énigme que pose l’homme face à son origine et sa destinée ne soit pas recouverte par une pensée qui se perdrait dans la description des choses ou dans l’esprit de système, mais qui non plus n’irait se recroqueviller sur elle-même, en narrant sa propre expérience subjective sous le mode de la déréliction. Claude Tresmontant a su penser l’être en genèse, et il a cherché à renouveler la question de l’existence de Dieu, en en transformant la problématique en dialogue avec les sciences contemporaines. À ce goût de l’être dont les sciences ont renouvelé l’approche, il a également voulu infuser un « supplément d’âme », en repensant la réalité de la création et l’horizon de la cause finale, toujours à partir de la nature ultimement théologique de la réponse à la question « qu’est-ce que l’homme ? » Contributeurs : Yves Tourenne, Philippe Gagnon, Fabien Revol, Brunor, Frédéric Crouslé, Bertrand Souchard, Emmanuel Gabellieri. Table of Contents: Note Liminaire (Ph. Gagnon) - 7 En quoi la pensée de Claude Tresmontant nous stimule-t-elle encore ? Hommage et critique (Y. Tourenne) - 13 L’imbrication de la preuve de Dieu et de la cosmologie chez Tresmontant représente-t-elle une preuve ? (Ph. Gagnon) - 27 L’usage apologétique de la philosophie de Tresmontant dans les Indices pensables de Brunor (F. Revol) - 49 Réponse à Fabien Revol (Brunor) - 77 Qu’est-ce qui cloche dans la théologie de Claude Tresmontant ? (Fr. Crouslé) - 85 Les métaphysiques principales de Claude Tresmontant : la foi biblique est-elle à part de la raison philosophique grecque ? (B. Souchard) - 109 Maurice Blondel et Claude Tresmontant (E. Gabellieri) - 123 La vision informationnelle de Tresmontant, surtout en référence au problème de l’âme (Ph. Gagnon) - 133. (shrink)

Par risques majeurs, on entend ceux qui s’attachent à des événements dont les conséquences défavorables, pour l’humanité ou pour l’environnement, sont d’une gravité exceptionnelle. On n’ajoutera ni que ces événements sont d’une intensité physique extrême, ni qu’ils surviennent rarement, car ce n’est pas toujours le cas. Seuls des risques majeurs de nature civile seront considérés dans cet ouvrage, et il s'agira, plus limitativement, de risques naturels, comme ceux d’inondation et de submersion marine, illustrés par la tempête Xynthia en 2010, de (...) risques technologiques industriels, comme celui d’une explosion d'usine, illustré par la catastrophe AZF en 2001, et de risques nucléaires, pour autant qu’ils mettent en jeu les dangers de la radioactivité, et qu’illustrent, hors de France, les catastrophes de Three Miles Island (1979), Tchernobyl (1986) et Fukushima (2011), -/- Conçu comme un rapport destiné au Conseil d'analyse économique (CAE) du Premier Ministre français, l'ouvrage comporte une introduction traitant du risque majeur pris en général (section 1). Dans sa partie principale, il aborde les trois risques majeurs qu'il a sélectionnés à travers les prismes successifs de la géographie et de la technologie (section 2), de l’histoire institutionnelle et juridique (section 3), enfin d’un bilan normatif accompagné de recommandations pour l'action publique (section 4). -/- Neuf compléments spécialisés, dus à d'autres auteurs, complètent l'ouvrage. Ils portent sur des aspects technologiques (F. Ménage; A. Quantin et D. Moucoulon; P. Saint-Raymond), juridiques (V. Sanseverino-Godfrin), économiques généraux (C. Grislain-Letrémy et B. Villeneuve; R. Lahidji; J. Percebois; A. Schmitt et S. Spaeter) et financiers (M. Pappalardo) et ils concernent principalement le risque nucléaire. -/- Dans cet ensemble de vaste format, on espère avoir su proposer, non seulement des évaluations et des préconisations destinées aux pouvoirs publics, comme il convenait au projet initial de rapport, mais aussi une synthèse qui soit utilisable par tous ceux - décideurs, scientifiques ou simples observateurs - que préoccupent les questions de risques majeurs. (shrink)

Prepoved heteroglosse, ki jo je v imenu oblikovanja nekakšne komunikacijske skupnosti prvi izpeljal sam Pavel iz Tarza, tj. prepoved samoizgrajevanja, prepoved osebnega pristopa k ontološkemu misteriju, večkratno nakazuje strah pred tranzitivnostjo misterija. S tem je tudi prvič v zgodovini prišel na dan strah institucije pred posameznikom. Taisti strah se je pozneje ohranjal stoletja: naj v Poeziji molči tisti, ki govori s simboli; naj v Umetnosti molči simbolična umetnost; naj v Filozofiji molči tisti, ki misli nemisljivo, ki izreka neizrekljivo. To implicira, (...) da se naša zahteva po heteroglossi iz tega osnutka možne filozofije religije lahko in mora izpeljati na področju estetike, etike, filozofije in predvsem politike. Vprašanje možnosti heteroglosse je vprašanje svobode afirmiranja in negiranja, pravice do aritmike, do lastnosti, nenavadnosti, posebnosti. To je vprašanje pravice do nepripadanja skupnosti, v kateri Veliki hermenevtik stopa med osebnost in Mysteriumom. (shrink)

Most artworks—or at least most among those standardly subject to philosophical scrutiny—appear to be singular, stand-alone works. However, some artworks (indeed, perhaps a good many) are by contrast best viewed in terms of some larger grouping or ordering of artworks. i.e., as a series. The operative art-theoretic notion of series in which I am interested here is that of an individual and distinct artwork that is itself non-trivially composed of a non-trivial sequence of artworks (e.g., Walter de Maria’s Statement Series, (...) Krzysztof Kieslowski’s Three Colors)—as opposed to an art-historically informative or art critically productive thematically, stylistically, or formally unified ordering or grouping of individual and distinct artworks within an artist’s larger body of work (e.g., Kiki Smith’s Blue Print series, Dan Flavin’s Monuments to V. Tatlin series, Jeff Koons’ Made in Heaven series, Robert Rauschenberg’s Tribute 21 series). Given this, my aim is simply to sketch a minimal descriptive and classificatory framework for serial art within which certain informative distinctions may be made and further philosophical enquiry may productively take place. (shrink)

Le présent article entend aborder la critique de l’intellect agent de Durand de Saint-Pourçain (v.1275-1334) et l’une des réactions immédiates suscitées par celle-ci, que l’on trouve dans les Evidentiae contra Durandum de Durandellus. Après une brève présentation de ce texte et de certains enjeux philologiques reliés à l’étude de la noétique de Durand et de ses adversaires, nous proposons une analyse de certains arguments centraux de Durand contre l’intellect agent et de ceux que leur oppose Durandellus. Ce faisant, nous entrons (...) en dialogue avec Serge-Thomas Bonino, seul commentateur à s’être jusqu’ici intéressé au débat entre Durandellus et Durand au sujet de l’intellect agent, et contestons certaines de ses analyses et conclusions. (shrink)

Platon s'est inspir? des travaux philosophiques de certains de ses pr?d?cesseurs, en particulier Socrate, mais aussi Parm?nide, H?raclite et Pythagore, pour d?velopper sa propre philosophie, qui explore les domaines les plus importants, notamment la m?taphysique, l'?thique, l'esth?tique et la politique. Avec son professeur Socrate et son ?l?ve Aristote, il pose les bases de la pens?e philosophique occidentale. Platon est consid?r? comme l'un des philosophes les plus importants et les plus influents de l'histoire humaine, ?tant l'un des fondateurs de la religion (...) et de la spiritualit? occidentales. La philosophie qu'il a d?velopp?e, connue sous le nom de platonisme, est bas?e sur la th?orie des Formes connues par la raison pure comme une solution au probl?me des universaux. La philosophie de Platon s'inscrit dans la lign?e des pr?socratiques, des sophistes et des traditions artistiques qui sous-tendent l'?ducation grecque, dans un cadre nouveau, d?fini par la dialectique et la th?orie des Id?es. Pour Platon, la connaissance est une activit? de l'?me, affect?e par des objets sensibles, et par des processus internes. Dans La R?publique de Platon, la forme la plus ?lev?e est consid?r?e comme la Forme du Bien, la source de toutes les autres Formes qui pourraient ?tre connues par la raison. Le th?me central du livre est la justice, argument?e ? l'aide de plusieurs th?ories platoniciennes, dont le mythe all?gorique de la caverne, la doctrine des Id?es, la dialectique, la th?orie de l'?me et la conception d'une cit? id?ale. Sa dialectique est un type de connaissance, ? r?le ontologique et m?taphysique, qui s'atteint par la confrontation de plusieurs positions pour d?passer l'opinion (doxa), un passage du monde des apparences (ou ? sensible ?) ? la connaissance intellectuelle (ou ? intelligible ? ) aux premiers principes. Le mod?le ?ducatif de Platon (paid?ia) diff?rencie le niveau d'?ducation selon les comp?tences des ?l?ves. Selon les principes socratiques, pour faire justice, il faut savoir ce qui est bien, et c'est ce que le philosophe sait le mieux. Platon a d?taill? ce concept en soulignant la distinction entre le philosophe (qui cherche les principes de v?rit? sans pr?tendre les poss?der) et le sophiste (qui se laisse guider par l'opinion comme seul param?tre valable de la connaissance). (shrink)

Azərbaycan elm tarixini tədqiq edərkən dövrün tələbindən çıxış edilərək ərəb və fars dillərində yazılmış çoxlu əsərlərə rast gəlirik. Bu əsərlərdən biri də dahi alim Nəsirəddin Tusinin fars dilində məntiqə dair yazdığı Əsasül-iqtibas əsəridir. Əsər ilk dəfə 2022-ci ildə nəşr edilərək oxucu və tədqiqatçıların ixtiyarına verilmişdir. Əsasül-iqtibas əsəri XIII əsrin ortalarında yazılmışdır. Əsərin yazılmasından təqribən səkkiz əsrə yaxın vaxt keçmişdir. Bu müddət ərzində həmin əsərdə istifadə edilən bir sıra termin və sözlər artıq müasir fars dilində istifadə edilmir. Əsərin məntiqə aid olması (...) və həm də bir sıra sözlərin günümüzdə istifadə edilməməsi onun tərcüməsini çətinləşdirən amillər kimi qeyd etmək olar. Bundan əlavə burada istifadə edilən bəzi terminlərin gündəlik danışığımzda fərqli mənada istifadə edildiyindən həmin sözlərin və terminlərin izah edilməsi zərurəti yaranmışdır. Habelə orta əsr müəlliflərinin əsərlərinin tədqiqi zamanı eyni bir sözün müxtəlif müəlliflər tərəfindən fərqli mənalarda işlədildiyinin də şahidi oluruq ki, bu da həmin termin və anlayışların Azərbaycan dilinə tərcüməsi zamanı izahının verilməsinə ehtiyac yaradır. Hal-hazırda müraciət etdiyiniz bu kitab Nəsirəddin Tusinin ən mühüm və genişhəcmli əsərlərindən biri olan “Əsasül-iqtibas”-ın tərcüməsi zamanı əsərin orijinalında işlədilmiş ərəb-fars sözlərinin izahlı tərcüməsi yönündə tərtib edilmişdir. Bu lüğətlərin tərcüməsi və izahı ilə tanış olmaqla Nəsirəddin Tusinin ərəb-fars dillərində yazılmış digər əsərlərinin tərcüməsi zamanı da yararlanmaq olar. Müəyyən bir ixtisas və peşəni və ya həmin peşə və ixtisasa aid olan terminləri başa düşmək üçün həmin istiqamət üzrə tərtib edilən terminolji lüğətlərə ehtiyac duyulur. Bu istiqamətdə zaman-zaman müxtəlif ixtisaslar üzrə terminoloji lüğətlərin nəşr edildiyini müşahidə edirik. Azərbaycan dilində məntiqi terminlərin izahından ibarət xüsusi termonoloji lüğətlərin də tərtib edilməsi zərurəti vardır. Çünki məntiq terminlərinin izahınına adətən rus dilində yazılmış ədəbiyyatda, bir neçə terminin izahı verilmiş məntiq kitablarında və ya fəlsəfi terminlərdən ibarət ensiklopediya və lüğətlərdə rast gəlmək mümkündür. Bir tərəfdən, yaranmış boşluğu doldurmaq, digər tərəfdən isə məntiq ixtisası üzrə təhsil alan tələbə və mütəxəssislərə kömək etmək üçün bu lüğəti tərtib etmək qərarına gəldik. 222 sözün izah və tərcüməsindən ibarət olan bu kitabı həmin istiqamətdə olan boşluğu doldurmaq üçün kiçik və eyni zamanda mühüm bir addım hesab etmək olar. Burada sözlərin tərcüməsi ilə yanaşı bir sıra terminlərin izahı da verilmişdir. Əsasən Əsasül-iqtibas adlı məntiqi əsəri tərcümə edərkən qarşıya çıxan çətin və mürəkkəb sözlərin izahının verilməsinə üstünlük verilmişdir. Tərcümə zamanı müxtəlif illərdə nəşr edilən Əsasül-iqtibas əsərlərinə də müraciət edilmişdir. Bu əsərlərin bəzisində Əsasül-iqtibas əsərində istifadə edilən bəzi terminlərin izahı da verilmişdir. Bu izahlar bəzən tərcümə zamanı ifadənin daha səlis və daha dəqiq başa düşülməsinə imkan vermişdir. Bu lüğət kitabı tərtib edilərkən həmin əsərlərdə mövcud olan terminlər və onların izahından da istifadə edilmişdir. Bəzən məntiqi terminlərlə yanaşı kəlam, fəlsəfə və s. elmlərdə istifadə edilən terminləri də qeyd etmişik. Çünki bu terminlər bizə məntiqdə işlədilən bəzi ifadələrin daha asan başa düşülməsinə imkan verəcəkdir. “Əsasül-iqtibasa dair terminlər” lüğəti adlı bu kitabı bu sahədə atılmış ilk addımlardan biri olduğu üçün gələcəkdə daha sanballı və həcmcə daha geniş terminoloji lüğətlərin hazırlanması nəzərdə tutulur. (shrink)

Recenzio Kiraly V. Istvan Death and History c. konyverol.

Review the Istvan Kiraly V.'s book: Death and History.

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological (...) psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology. (shrink)

CUPRINS CONTUR Re-Introducere sau: Dincolo de „teoria şi practica” informării şi documentării – Spre o hermeneutică posibilă şi necesară ......................................................... 11 Desfăşurătorul întâlnirilor Atelierului Hermeneutica Bibliohtecaria (Philobiblon) .................................................................................................... ......... 21 FOCUS Noul Program al revistei şi Politica ei Editorială: PHILOBIBLON – Transylvanian Journal of Multidisciplinary Research in Humanities .............. 29 Raluca TRIFU, István KIRÁLY V., Consideraţii filosofice, epistemologice şi scientometrice legate de sensurile ştiinţei şi profesiei bibliotecare – Pentru situarea proiectului unei cercetări ............................................................ 31 Valeria SALÁNKI, Cultura organizaţională şi comunicarea în (...) bibliotecă - Studiu asupra culturii organizaţionale în Biblioteca Centrală Universitară „Lucian Blaga” din Cluj ........................................................................................ 44 Raluca TRIFU, István KIRÁLY V., Globalizare şi Individualizare, sau: Marketingul ca metaforă pentru reasumarea şi reconturarea sensurilor serviciilor de bibliotecă – O iniţiativă şi o experienţă românească .................114 Claudiu GAIU, Gabriel Naudé (1600-1653 ) – în slujba Puterii şi a Cărţii ..... 128 Alin Mihai GHERMAN, Timpul scrierii – Manuscrisele .................................... 140 Dana Maria MĂRCUŞ, Sărbătoarea cărţii. Percepţia societăţii româneşti interbelice asupra cărţii şi lecturii ...................................................................... 148 Orsolya ANTAL,Taine în jurul unei satire în spirit voltairian în limbă maghiară de la sfârşitul secolului al XVIII-lea .................................................................... 197 Kinga PAPP, Colligatul Ms 354 şi dramele pierdute ale lui József Mártonfi ....213 Gabriela RUS, Roxana BĂLĂUCĂ, Venceslav Melka în colecţia Bibliotecii Centrale Universitare „Lucian Blaga” Cluj-Napoca ........................................ 222 5 Hermeneutica Bibliothecaria – Antologie Philobiblon - Volumul V Nicolina HALGAŞ, Dimensiunea educativă a bibliotecii publice prin servicii de animaţie pentru copii ....................................................................................... 249 Tünde JANKÓ, Alina NEALCOŞ, Maria CRIŞAN, Mariana GROS, Carmen GOGA, Biblioteca Filială de Ştiinţe Economice - Tradiţional versus modern ................271 Adriana MAN SZÉKELY, Emil SALAMON, Colaborarea Bibliotecii Centrale Universitare „Lucian Blaga” din Cluj-Napoca cu Banca Mondială ............. 290 ORIZONTURI Aurel Teodor CODOBAN, Mass-media şi filosofia – Filosoful ca jurnalist, sau sinteza unei ideologii ostensive ............................................................................. 301 Marian PETCU, Şcoala de ziaristică de la Bucureşti (1951-1989) – Istorii recente .................................................................................................... .. 314 Marcel BODEA S., Timpul matematic în mecanica clasică – o perspectivă epistemologică...................................................................................... ................... 332 Florina ILIS, Fenomenul science fiction şi feţele timpului ................................ 354 Rodica FRENŢIU, Yasunari Kawabata şi nostalgia timpului fără timp ......... 373 Rodica TRANDAFIR, Timpul şi muzica .............................................................. 390 István KIRÁLY V., Întemeierea filosofiei şi ateismul la tânărul Heidegger - Prolegomene la o perspectivă existenţial-ontologică ......................................423 Elena CHIABURU, Consideraţii privitoare la vînzarea la Cochii Vechi şi mezat .................................................................................................... ............... 437 Vlad POPOVICI, Istoriografia medicală românească (1813-2008) .................463 Gheorghe VAIS, Remodelări urbane în Clujul perioadei dualiste (1867-1918)..... 481 Cristina VIDRUŢIU, Ciuma – profilul unei recurenţe istorice supusă unui transplant artistic .................................................................................................. 497 Anna Emese VINCZE, Iluziile pozitive din perspectiva psihologiei evoluţioniste .................................................................................................... 506 6 Hermeneutica Bibliothecaria – Antologie Philobiblon - Volumul V REFLEXII Florentina RĂCĂTĂIANU, Irina Petraş, Literatura română contemporană - O panoramă - Recenzie ...................................................................................... 527 Raluca TRIFU, Filosofia informaţiei si cibernetica – Recenzie ......................... 530 Iulia GRAD, Tematizări în eticile aplicate – perspective feministe (Mihaela Frunză) - Recenzie ................................................................................534 Adrian GRĂNESCU, Biblioteca lui Hitler, cărţile care i-au format personalitatea, de Timothy W. Ryback – Recenzie ............................................. 537 În colecţia BIBLIOTHECA BIBLIOLOGICA au apărut ..............................551 Revista PHILOBIBLON – Volumele apărute ......................................... 556. (shrink)

In this chapter we focus on the debate over publicly-maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the US (chiefly regarding the over 700 monuments devoted to the Confederacy), but to some degree also in Britain and Commonwealth countries, especially South Africa (chiefly regarding monuments devoted to figures and events associated with colonialism and apartheid). After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist, and neutrally categorize removalist (...) and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating, and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

In this article, I will argue against the Orthodox Jewish view that the Torah should be treated as an absolute authority. I begin with an explanation of what it means to treat something as an absolute authority. I then review examples of norms in the Torah that seem clearly immoral. Next, I explore reasons that people may have for accepting a person, text, or tradition as an absolute authority in general. I argue that none of these reasons can justify absolute (...) authority if the authority prescribes norms that we strongly judge to be immoral. I then respond to three objections to my argument. I end with a note explaining why, contrary to a popular trend, the narrative of the binding of Isaac is not a good place to start this discussion. (shrink)

The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.

The analysis of moral subject in consequentialist ethics (as a kind of nonutilitaristic consequentialism) aims to show, that moral subject is of basie importance for it - regardeless to the fact, that its analysis focuses predominantly on action and its concequences. It is the moral subject, which enables the action and its consequences to be performed. So understanding the conditions of moral subjecťs action means understanding the moral subject itself. This understanding draws upon the typology of moral subjects that makes (...) the prediction of certain kinds of action as well as oftheir consequencies possible. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I present data involving the use of the Romanian slur ‘țigan’, consideration of which leads to the postulation of a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of slurs. This type of use is potentially problematic for extant theories of slurs. In addition, together with other well-established uses, it shows that there is more variation in the use of slurs than previously acknowledged. I explain this variation by construing slurs as polysemous. To implement this idea, I appeal to (...) a rich-lexicon account of polysemy. I show how such a theory can be applied to slurs and discuss several important issues that arise. (shrink)

Given the close relatedness of local issues, water scarcity, and sustainability, this research sought to investigate the factors affecting residents’ willingness to reuse direct and indirect potable water in the arid region. Utilizing the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF), an analysis was undertaken with a sample of 1,831 water consumers in the City of Albuquerque, the most populous city in New Mexico, United States. The primary analysis revealed positive associations between local concerns about drought or water scarcity and population growth with (...) residents' willingness to reuse direct and indirect potable water. Conversely, concerns about water quality and water bills were found to be negatively associated with the willingness to utilize directly and indirectly recycled water for drinking. In light of these findings, the study explores the potential of fostering an eco-surplus culture by cultivating a sense of environmental responsibility and acknowledging the relationship between local issues and environmental conditions. Simultaneously, the study proposes collaboration between the government and residents to promote water reuse programs to conserve water resources effectively. (shrink)

Philosophers of physics have long debated whether the Past State of low entropy of our universe calls for explanation. What is meant by “calls for explanation”? In this article we analyze this notion, distinguishing between several possible meanings that may be attached to it. Taking the debate around the Past State as a case study, we show how our analysis of what “calling for explanation” might mean can contribute to clarifying the debate and perhaps to settling it, thus demonstrating the (...) fruitfulness of this analysis. Applying our analysis, we show that two main opponents in this debate, Huw Price and Craig Callender, are, for the most part, talking past each other rather than disagreeing, as they employ different notions of “calling for explanation”. We then proceed to show how answering the different questions that arise out of the different meanings of “calling for explanation” can result in clarifying the problems at hand and thus, hopefully, to solving them. (shrink)

In the recent debate about the semantics of perspectival expressions, disagreement has played a crucial role. In a nutshell, what I call “the challenge from disagreement” is the objection that certain views on the market cannot account for the intuition of disagreement present in ordinary exchanges involving perspectival expressions like “Licorice is tasty./no, it’s not.” Various contextualist answers to this challenge have been proposed, and this has led to a proliferation of notions of disagreement. It is now accepted in the (...) debate that there are many notions of disagreement and that the search for a common, basic notion is misguided. In this paper I attempt to find such a basic notion underneath this diversity. The main aim of the paper is to motivate, forge and defend a notion of “minimal disagreement” that has beneficial effects for the debate over the semantics of perspectival expressions. (shrink)

According to cognitive psychologists, moral decision-making is a dual-process phenomenon involving two types of cognitive processes: explicit reasoning and implicit intuition. Moral development involves training and integrating both types of cognitive processes through a mix of instruction, practice, and reflection. Serious games are an ideal platform for this kind of moral training, as they provide safe spaces for exploring difficult moral problems and practicing the skills necessary to resolve them. In this article, we present Morality Play, a model for the (...) design of serious games for ethical expertise development based on the Integrative Ethical Education framework from moral psychology and the Lens of the Toy model for serious game design. (shrink)

Because the techno-economic paradigm of contemporary conceptualizations of innovation is often taken for granted in the literature, this chapter opens up this self-evident notion. First, the chapter consults the work of Joseph Schumpeter, who can be seen as the founding father of the current conceptualization of innovation as technological and commercial. Second, we open up the concept by reflecting on two aspects of Schumpeter’s conceptualization of innovation, namely its destructive and its constructive aspect, based on findings in the history of (...) innovation. Finally, we synthesize our findings and propose an ontic-ontological conceptualization of innovation as ontogenetic process and outcome with six dimensions—newness, political dimension, economic dimension, temporal dimension, human dimension and risk—that moves beyond its technological and commercial orientation. (shrink)

In this paper, I engage with a recent contextualist account of gender terms proposed by Díaz-León, E. 2016. “Woman as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle.” Hypatia 31 : 245–58. Díaz-León’s main aim is to improve both on previous contextualist and non-contextualist views and solve a certain puzzle for feminists. Central to this task is putting forward a view that allows trans women who did not undergo gender-affirming medical procedures to use the gender terms of their choice (...) to self-identify. My goal is to investigate Díaz-León’s proposal, point out several shortcomings of the view and discuss possible replies on her part. (shrink)

Motivated by examples, many philosophers believe that there is a significant distinction between states of affairs that are striking and therefore call for explanation and states of affairs that are not striking. This idea underlies several influential debates in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, normative theory, philosophy of modality, and philosophy of science but is not fully elaborated or explored. This paper aims to address this lack of clear explanation first by clarifying the epistemological issue at hand. Then it introduces an (...) initially attractive account for strikingness that is inspired by the work of Paul Horwich and adopted by a number of philosophers. The paper identifies two logically distinct accounts that have both been attributed to Horwich and then argues that, when properly interpreted, they can withstand former criticisms. The final two sections present a new set of considerations against both Horwichian accounts that avoid the shortcomings of former critiques. It remains to be seen whether an adequate account of strikingness exists. (shrink)

Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry (...) of the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)

This paper is a warning that objections based on thought experiments can be misleading because they may elicit judgments that, unbeknownst to the judger, have been seriously skewed by psychological biases. The fact that most people choose not to plug in to the Experience Machine in Nozick’s (1974) famous thought experiment has long been used as a knock-down objection to hedonism because it is widely thought to show that real experiences are more important to us than pleasurable experiences. This paper (...) argues that the commonplace choice to remain in reality when offered a life in the Experience Machine is best explained by status quo bias – the irrational preference for things to remain the same. An alternative thought experiment, empirical evidence, and discussion of how psychological biases can affect our judgments are provided to support this argument. (shrink)

Many times, what we say proves to be wrong. It might turn out that what we took to be a comforting remark was, in fact, making things worse. Or that a joke was inappropriate. Or that yelling out loud was rude. More importantly for this paper, there are plenty of cases in which what we said turns out to be false: we spoke without paying attention, we were misinformed or tricked, or we made a reasoning mistake. -/- A particular instance (...) of this latter phenomenon is when someone changes their perspective and doesn't find their previous assertions true anymore. For example, imagine that you used to like licorice as a child, and that you went around saying things like "Licorice is tasty." But, growing up, you find licorice too strong and quite boring; your tastes have changed. While the taste of licorice itself has not changed, you are not going around anymore uttering "Licorice is tasty." In fact, in certain cases, you might even think that what you said in your childhood was wrong - at least in light of your present preferences. -/- Sometimes we "take back" the assertions we made when we realize they are no longer true. Such speech acts of taking back can be performed in various ways: more formally, as effected in a court of law or when an official speaks to the press, or more informally in our day-by-day interactions. These acts of taking back are known as retraction. Retraction is usually achieved by employing certain linguistic markers ('I was wrong', 'I was mistaken', 'I retract', "Scratch that' etc.) that signal that the retractor takes their previous speech act to be faulty in a certain way. -/- This phenomenon has formed the basis for a popular argument used by relativists about a variety of natural language expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) in support of their view. Recently, several considerations (mostly from contextualists about the same expressions), both from the armchair and based on empirical studies, have been offered to undercut the support retraction was thought to provide for relativism. In this paper, I consider and re-evaluate that support in light of both types of considerations, showing that neither of them decisively undermines it. However, to survive the contextualist counterattack, the relativist needs to pay a price: that is, she will be forced to make some concessions or rethink certain claims. I show what I think those concessions should be and what needs to be rethought (and how). The upshot is that, while the support retraction offers relativism is not as strong as initially believed, appeal to retraction remains a legitimate move in the debate. In section 1, I introduce the views in the debate and clarify the phenomenon of retraction and its dialectical role. Armchair data are investigated in section 2, proper experimental studies in section 3, while section 4 summarizes and concludes. (shrink)

The idea that there are some facts that call for explanation serves as an unexamined premise in influential arguments for the inexistence of moral or mathematical facts and for the existence of a god and of other universes. This book is the first to offer a comprehensive and critical treatment of this idea. It argues that calling for explanation is a sometimes-misleading figure of speech rather than a fundamental property of facts.

John is currently thinking that the sun is bright. Consider his occurrent belief or judgement that the sun is bright. Its content is that the sun is bright. This is a truth- evaluable content (which shall be our main concern) because it is capable of being true or false. In virtue of what natural, scientifically accessible facts does John’s judgement have this content? To give the correct answer to that question, and to explain why John’s judgement and other contentful mental (...) states have the contents they do in virtue of such facts, would be to naturalize mental content. (shrink)

Crispin Wright and Filippo Ferrari have accused relativism of not accounting for “parity” – the idea that, when we argue over matters of taste, we take our opponents’ opinions to be “as good as ours” from our own, committed perspective. In this paper, I show that i) explaining parity has not been taken to be a desideratum by relativists and thus they cannot be accused of failing to fulfil a promise; ii) Wright’s and Ferrari’s reasons for claiming that parity should (...) be a desideratum are unconvincing. (shrink)

Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts (...) for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries. (shrink)

In a well-known paper, Reginald Jackson expresses a sentiment not uncommon among readers of Locke: “Among the merits of Locke’s Essay…not even the friendliest critic would number consistency.”2 This unflattering opinion of Locke is reiterated by Maurice Mandelbaum: “Under no circumstances can [Locke] be counted among the clearest and most consistent of philosophers.”3 The now familiar story is that there are innumerable inconsistencies and internal problems contained in Locke’s Essay. In fact, it is probably safe to say that there is (...) not another canonical, well-respected, and seminal philosopher whose work is so widely thought to be swarming with inconsistencies. I, however, do not think that the common, unflattering view of Locke is accurate as a general view of the Essay. But despite my wishes to the contrary, I do believe that Locke’s chapter ‘Of Identity and Diversity’ (2.27)4 leads to (at least) one intractable problem, a problem that is the subject of this paper. (shrink)

Introduction There are some exceptions, which we shall see below, but virtually all theories in psychology and cognitive science make use of the notion of representation. Arguably, folk psychology also traffics in representations, or is at least strongly suggestive of their existence. There are many different types of things discussed in the psychological and philosophical literature that are candidates for representation-hood. First, there are the propositional attitudes – beliefs, judgments, desires, hopes etc. (see Chapters 9 and 17 of this volume). (...) If the propositional attitudes are representations, they are person-level representations – the judgment that the sun is bright pertains to John, not a subpersonal part of John. By contrast, the representations of edges in V1 of the cerebral cortex that neuroscientists talk about and David Marr’s symbolic representations of “zero-crossings” in early vision (Marr 1982) are at the “sub-personal” level – they apply to parts or states of a person (e.g. neural parts or computational states of the visual system). Another important distinction is often made among perceptual, cognitive, and action-oriented representations (e.g. motor commands). Another contrast lies between “stored representations” (e.g. memories) and “active representations” (e.g. a current perceptual state). Related to this is the distinction between “dispositional representations” and “occurrent representations.” Beliefs that are not currently being entertained are dispositional, e.g. your belief that the United States is in North America - no doubt you had this belief two minutes ago, but you were not consciously accessing it until you read this sentence. Occurrent representations, by contrast, are active, conscious thoughts or perceptions. Which leads us to another important distinction: 1 between conscious and non-conscious mental representations, once a bizarre-sounding distinction that has become familiar since Freud (see Chapter 4 of this volume). I mention these distinctions at the outset to give you some idea of the range of phenomena we will be considering, and to set the stage for our central “problem of representation”: what is a mental representation, exactly, and how do we go about deciding whether there are any? We know there are public representations of various kinds: words, maps, and pictures, among others.. (shrink)

Traditional theism says that the goodness of everything comes from God. Moreover, the goodness of something intrinsically valuable can only come from what has it. Many conclude from these two claims that no creatures have intrinsic value if traditional theism is true. I argue that the exemplarist theory of the divine ideas gives the theist a way out. According to exemplarism, God creates everything according to ideas that are about himself, and so everything resembles God. Since God is wholly good (...) in every way, and since ethical supervenience is true, it follows that creatures have intrinsic value. (shrink)

In this conceptual paper, the traditional conceptualization of sustainable entrepreneurship is challenged because of a fundamental tension between processes involved in sustainable development and processes involved in entrepreneurship: the concept of sustainable business models contains a paradox, because sustainability involves the reduction of information asymmetries, whereas entrepreneurship involves enhanced and secured levels of information asymmetries. We therefore propose a new and integrated theory of sustainable entrepreneurship that overcomes this paradox. The basic argument is that environmental problems have to be conceptualized (...) as wicked problems or sustainability-related ecosystem failures. Because all actors involved in the entrepreneurial process are characterized by their epistemic insufficiency regarding the solving of these problems, the role of information in the sustainable entrepreneurial process changes. On the one hand, the reduction of information asymmetries primarily aims to enable actors to become critical of sustainable entrepreneurs’ actual business models. On the other hand, the epistemic insufficiency of sustainable entrepreneurs guarantees that information asymmetries remain as a source of new sustainable business opportunities. Three further characteristics of sustainable entrepreneurs are distinguished: sustainability and entrepreneurship-related risk-taking; sustainability and entrepreneurship-related self-efficacy; and the development of satisficing and open-ended solutions, together with multiple stakeholders. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a range of existent and possible ameliorative semantic theories of gender terms: invariantism, according to which gender terms are not context-sensitive, contextualism, according to which the meaning of gender terms is established in the context of use, and relativism, according to which the meaning of gender terms is established in the context of assessment. I show that none of these views is adequate with respect to the plight of trans people to use their term of (...) choice to self-identify and be referred to accordingly. I then consider an invariantist view based on self-identification and explore some of its challenges. (shrink)

Contrary to the tendency to harmony, consensus and alignment among stakeholders in most of the literature on participation and partnership in corporate social responsibility and responsible innovation practices, in this chapter we ask which concept of participation and partnership is able to account for stakeholder engagement while acknowledging and appreciating their fundamentally different judgements, value frames and viewpoints. To this end, we reflect on a non-reductive and ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel (...) Levinas. We contrast a cognitive approach with an ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, and explore four characteristics of this ethical approach. Based on the ethical approach to stakeholder engagement, collaboration and partnership, we also provide a three-stage framework for partnership formation in CSR and RI practices. (shrink)

Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive-neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this abstract and yet there is nothing surprising about this fact. We offer a novel theory that explains (...) when and why an unexpected fact is surprising. We distinguish between descriptive and normative notions of what is surprising; clarify the sense in which surprising facts are unexpected; and, finally, develop and defend the significance account of surprise, according to which a fact is surprising to an agent if and to the extent that it is both unexpected and significant to the agent. Since a surprising fact can be significant to an agent in various ways—personal, moral, epistemic, and aesthetic—surprise is not merely or primarily epistemic. Fitting surprise reflects more than a person’s view of what is; it reflects a person’s view of what is significant. (shrink)